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Jeremy Waldron
Is law objective? The question is oddly unsatisfactory-Objective in
what sense? Objective compared with what?-and one is naturally curi-
ous to know why it is being asked. The best way to approach Kent
Greenawalt's latest book' is to begin with the accusations made against
traditional legal reasoning by members of the Critical Legal Studies
(CLS) movement. Legal reasoning has been called "indeterminate and
contradictory" 2 by CLS scholars: it "cannot resolve questions in an
'objective' manner,"3 for it is "not a method or process that leads reason-
able, competent and fair-minded people to particular results in particular
cases."
4
Professor Greenawalt is sensitive to this' critique, and though he says
his purpose in Law and Objectivity "is not to defend some pre-existing
version of 'traditional legal thought' " (p. viii), his sensitivity often seems
very personal. He tells a familiar autobiographical story about the confi-
dence in objective rules and right answers that he brought with him to
law school:
I thought that law was a set of legal rules that applied straightfor-
wardly to events in life, that the lawyer's task was to know a lot
about these rules and use them in trying cases and giving advice. I
am not quite sure just how I developed this view. Perhaps it was
from listening to radio dramas-my parents did not purchase a TV
during my formative years-in which the law of criminal guilt was
1. KENT GREENAWALT, LAW AND OBJECTIVITY (1992). All parenthetical page references in
the text are to this work. The book is an expansion of Professor Greenawalt's Julius Rosenthal
Lectures, delivered at Northwestern University School of Law in 1988 and 1989.
2. Joseph Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1, 6
(1984), cited in GREENAWALT, supra note 1, at 34.
3. Id.
4. David Kairys, Law and Politics, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 243, 244 (1984), cited in
GREENAWALT, supra note 1, at 34.
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clear and the only issue was "Who done it?" Perhaps I had a deep
psychological need for certainty (p. 5).
Greenawalt relates the rude awakening he suffered when he discovered in
his "IL" classes that legal argument was a malleable and manipulative
technique, that reasons could be adduced for either side in the cases set
out in the textbooks, and that the vaunted objectivity of law might be
nothing more than "a cruel, patronizing delusion" (p. 5).
There can be no question of recovering that original innocence; Green-
awalt acknowledges that the radio days are gone forever. Indeed, he says,
there is a chance that his remaining shreds of certainty are simply arti-
facts of his "insufficient familiarity with the work of critical legal schol-
ars, feminist legal scholars, and scholars writing about how legal
interpretation resembles other interpretive efforts" (p. vii). Nevertheless,
he cannot help feeling that the radical critics of law are exaggerating
their skepticism for theoretical effect: "Does anyone really think the law
usually fails to provide answers to legal questions, in a sense of 'fails' that
has some practical significance?" (p. 11).
That last phrase-"practical significance"-turns out to be very
important. Greenawalt does not explicitly present himself as a pragma-
tist: he does not argue as a matter of jurisprudence that claims to legal
certainty are to be tested in the realm of practice and not dismissed
merely for want of abstract epistemic credentials. It is significant, how-
ever, that the one brief chapter in which he addresses philosophical
grounds for legal skepticism is presented as a "theoretical digression"
which uninterested readers "may skip" (p. 69). Thus, as far as I can tell,
the aim of Law and Objectivity is not to make a rigorous philosophical
case for certainty in the law. Its aim is to discredit the more hyperbolic
CLS formulations and to redeem a sense that there is still enough cer-
tainty in the application of legal rules and in the techniques of legal argu-
ment to warrant the pride that many practitioners take in the intellectual
respectability of their profession.' Though Greenawalt's style is that of
an analytic philosopher-with fine distinctions and concocted exam-
ples-he insists that his intention is "to speak comprehensibly to nonthe-
oreticians" (p. 6). And though his readers are bound to be mainly law
professors, he suggests that his argument will have succeeded if it con-
vinces those among his colleagues who concentrate like practitioners on
particular areas in the law, rather than on "the shifting fashions of legal
theory" (p. 5).
II
Greenawalt's case for legal objectivity is based in part on what he takes
5. The very first endnote in the book mentions that the author developed his adolescent belief in
legal certainty "despite the fact that my father was a lawyer who knew better" (p. 237).
[Vol. 5: 55 3
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to be the indisputable determinacy of ordinary language. The first sub-
stantive chapter of the book is devoted to an analysis of the following
encounter:
When Sam enters the office of his boss, Beth, she says, "Good morn-
ing, Sam, please shut the door." . . . If nothing in Beth's tone of
voice[footnote omitted] or in Sam's past relations with Beth suggests
other than a straightforward significance to Beth's words, [footnote
omitted] Sam has a clear idea of what he needs to do to comply. He
is supposed to walk to the door of Beth's office and shut it immedi-
ately. Sam's understanding does not depend on any prior relation-
ship between Beth and Sam; he will know what to do even if it is the
first day on the job for him or Beth .... If Sam walks over to the
door and shuts it, he has complied with Beth's directive. If in full
command of his faculties, he sits down in a chair and doesn't budge
for five minutes, he has failed to comply [footnote omitted] (pp. 13-
14).
Greenawalt thinks that this happy example shows "that imperative lan-
guage can be substantially determinate in context" (p. 14). One suspects
that whether this optimism is justified will depend, in large measure, on
the ellipses-"[footnote omitted]"-that I have indicated; and that
indeed is the way it will turn out. For the moment, however, let us trace
Greenawalt's argument as he presents it in the body of his book.
The basic idea is that since Beth and Sam share a linguistic compe-
tence in English, they have a common understanding of the meaning of
"shut" and "door," of the syntactical significance of their arrangement in
this utterance, and of the tones and conventions associated with the
imperative mood. Beth knows what Sam is likely to think she intends
when he hears these sounds, he knows that she knows that and that that
is the reason she is making them, and so on. In addition to the coordina-
tion that these strictly linguistic conventions enable Beth and Sam to
establish, Sam is likely also to make certain contextual assumptions. He
knows, for example, that the customary time for compliance with such
requests in a business setting is immediately upon receiving them, and
that it is usually the door to the office that the maker of such a request
wants closed rather than, say, the door to a drinks cabinet or to the pri-
vate bathroom behind her.
Of course, the interaction between Beth and Sam concerns a one-on-
one directive rather than a legal rule. But the basic point about linguistic
and contextual determinacy translates, Greenawalt believes, into the
legal case. Suppose a city ordinance reads "Persons walking dogs in pub-
lic parks must have their dogs leashed." A citizen of the town, whom
Greenawalt calls "Olive," knows the meaning of "dog" and "park" and
knows that these terms apply, respectively, to her pedigree Alsatian
Angus and to the green area set aside for recreation in the center of town,
1993]
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if they apply to anything at all. She also knows what "walk" means when
used as a transitive verb, and she knows the meaning of "leashed"-con-
trolled by the person walking the dog, specifically by means of a thong,
one end of which is held in the hand, the other end attached to the dog.
There is simply no room for disagreement about the fact that she would
be violating the ordinance if, for example, she were to bring Angus to the
park and deliberately set him loose--detaching him from the thong she
was holding-to run free over the lawns as he pleased. Though the
authors of the ordinance did not have this particular situation in mind, as
Beth had in mind Sam's closing the door that very morning, they had it
in mind nevertheless to issue a directive in language that happens to
apply uncontroversially and thus, as Greenawalt wants to say, objectively
to Olive's situation (pp. 42-44).
In the light of examples like this, Greenawalt concludes that CLS
scholars are exaggerating when they say that the application of legal
rules is always indeterminate. But unless his point is simply to show them
up as having exaggerated their thesis, the case for objectivity must be
taken a little bit further than that. What is it about Olive's case or the
Sam-Beth interaction that enables us to speak of the determinacy of
rules? What is it in these examples that casts real light on the issues and
quandaries of modem jurisprudence?
It cannot be merely the existence of natural languages and linguistic
conventions, assigning semantic value to words like "dog" and "door" or
significance to syntactical arrangements like "[noun] [adjective phrase]
must have [noun] [verb]-ed." Greenawalt is right to insist that skeptics
cannot build anything on indeterminacy at this level; such skepticism
would be belied by their own practice of publishing (skeptical) books and
articles in English for others to read. This is not to say that natural lan-
guage provides terms that apply themselves deductively and
unproblematically to determine the outcome of particular cases.6 Nor is
it to say that we currently possess a good account of linguistic conven-
tions. It is simply to say that, in law as in other areas of life, we take
6. Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV.795, 798 (1989),
alleges:
In the traditional conception of the nature of rules, a rule is self-applying to the set of
particulars said to fall under it; its application is thought to be analytic .... Another way of
putting this is to think that somehow the applications to particulars are already present in the
rule itself.
If the traditional view is supposed to be that words light up or click like geiger counters in the
presence of the particulars to which they apply, it is of course, as Radin notes, absurd, and it is no
surprise that no one held it. Perhaps Radin means that traditional jurists thought that the meaning
of a general word was a set-theoretic list of the particulars to which it applied; one could then
"deduce" particular applications from an understanding of the general concept. But a moment's
reflection reveals that this also is too absurd to have been held by any respectable philosopher, let
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advantage of the conventional existence of languages and of their place in
our ordinary dealings with one another.
In this regard, critics have made much of certain arguments in Ludwig
Wittgenstein's later work, in particular his suggestion that it is impossi-
ble to provide determinate criteria for assessing whether or not one is
following a given rule (like the rule for generating a numerical series by
addition, or the rule for the use of the word "pain").' Greenawalt is right
to notice that the fact that this is generally referred to as an argument
about "rule-following" does not mean that it has any particular relevance
to the law. It has relevance only at the level of the determination of ordi-
nary language meaning, on which law, like other social institutions, may
rely:
No one denies that for ordinary cases, human beings have practical
rules for adding and for describing standard instances of doors. If
legal applications can achieve that degree of certainty, they are cer-
tain enough .... The general skepticism about rules offers no basis,
because it does not consider the question, for saying that legal appli-
cations are subject to some uncertainty that does not beset standard
instances of addition and naming objects (p. 72).
All the same, Greenawalt's discussion of the Wittgensteinian issue is
rather peremptory. It is not at all clear what use there is for a jurispru-
dential work on legal objectivity, if it devotes no more than a page and a
half to a topic that has provoked as much misunderstanding as this has.
John Stuart Mill once remarked that the hard thing about political argu-
ment was not convincing your audience of the plausibility of your opin-
ion, but convincing them that there were no other considerations on the
matter which, if brought up, would cast doubt upon it.' This reviewer,
for example, is sure that Greenawalt's conclusion on the Wittgenstein
issue is correct, but that is only because he has read something more than
Greenawalt's brisk assurances on the matter.9 Greenawalt says nothing
to convince anyone who thinks that the force of the "rule-following"
problem for law lies in the detailed application of Wittgenstein's argu-
ment to the legal context.
7. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 56e-88e paragraphs 143-242
(G.E.M. Anscombe ed., 1967).
8. See John Stuart Mill, On the Spirit of the Age, II, in 22 COLLECTED WORKS OF JOHN STUART
MILL 238, 243 (Ann P. Robson and John M. Robson eds., 1986). In this essay, Mill concedes that
ordinary people are capable of following complicated arguments in economics and philosophy.
"But," he continues, "when all is done, there still remains something which they must always and
inevitably take upon trust: and this is, that the arguments really are as conclusive as they appear;
that there exist no considerations relevant to the subject which have been kept back from them; that
every objection which can suggest itself has been duly examined by competent judges, and found
immaterial."
9. For a deeper discussion, see Brian Bix, The Application (and Mis-Application) of Wittgenstein's
Rule-Following Considerations to Legal Theory, in WiTrGENSTEIN AND LEGAL THEORY 209
(Dennis Paterson ed., 1991).
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Besides natural language, Greenawalt rests the case for determinacy in
the Sam-Beth and Olive examples on the existence of shared contextual
assumptions. When Sam hears the instruction, "Please shut the door," in
a room where there are several doors, he must quickly infer which one is
meant. There are two ways in which he can approach this. His first clue
is Beth's use of the phrase "the door" without any further qualification.
This indicates that she intends him to shut the door which will most
quickly occur to him as the object of her intention: the door he has just
opened, for example, or the door he has walked through, or the door
whose handle he is holding. If she had intended him to shut some door
other than the one she expected him to think of first, she would have
added something to the phrase. Choice of door here is like identifying a
salient point in the solution of a coordination problem. Alternatively,
Sam may ask himself what the purpose of her directive might be, and
take his clue as to choice of door from that. Bosses often want to conduct
conversations with employees without being overheard or casually inter-
rupted: these are reasons for focusing on the door to the outer office,
rather than on the door to the drinks cabinet or the door to the
bathroom.
This second strategy is particularly important in the case of a legal
directive. It may occur to Olive, in our example, to wonder whether the
leashing ordinance-"Persons walking dogs in public parks must have
their dogs leashed"-has the same logic as "Persons walking dogs in
public parks must have their dogs vaccinated." Owners are not expected
to be actually vaccinating their pets while they are walking them around
the park; accordingly, Olive may wonder whether it is sufficient to com-
ply with the leashing ordinance that Angus has been held on a leash at
some time in the past twelve months. This possibility, however, does not
survive any speculation as to the point or purpose of the ordinance. No
plausible purpose could be served by it except on the assumption that the
leashing referred to is leashing during the period that the dog in question
is actually being walked in the park (p. 43).
Olive might try another tack. Angus is an exceptionally well-behaved
dog and is much less of a menace off the leash than most dogs are on it.
Can he not then be considered constructively leashed, by a sort of legal
fiction? According to Greenawalt, this question can often be answered
firmly in the negative: "[T]his sort of minor offense needs simple enforce-
ment. Police and park officials can see if dogs are unleashed; control is
more subtle" (p. 44). If Olive's interpretation were adopted, probably
only owners whose dogs caused serious havoc would end up in court.
The legislature has used the literal language of leashing rather than the
general language of control, and presumably had a reason for making
that choice. And so on.
The same appeal to underlying purposes may help in dealing with a
[Vol. 5: 5 53
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problem that is often taken to be the basis of legal uncertainty-the prob-
lem of exceptional cases. Let us return to Sam and Beth. As Sam goes to
close the door he sees the company president approaching the entrance,
evidently intending to enter. Should he interpret Beth's directive as
instructing him to close the door in the president's face? Clearly not; but
what happens to determinacy and objectivity, once this sort of excep-
tional case is admitted? Sam may conjecture that Beth would not want
him to close the door in these circumstances; but that may not be a route
to rule-determinacy in general, involving as it does one person's subjec-
tive speculations about what another's intentions might have been in
some given circumstance. Alternatively, Sam may base his hesitation on
a consideration of the purpose underlying the directive, and the broader
purpose served by his subjection in general to directives from his superi-
ors in the organization:
If purpose is put at the very abstract level of the company's welfare,
shutting the door [as the president approaches] will disserve the very
purpose that led Beth to ask Sam to shut the door.... Sam and
others in similar situations are expected to act with some sensitivity
to the reasons for the directives, not carrying them out when unex-
pected events raise exceptionally strong countervailing reasons (p.
18).
Greenawalt toys briefly with the idea that the requirement that Sam
should exercise this sensitivity is built into the very meaning of Beth's
directive (that is, what she means is "Please shut the door unless ... ").
He rejects that, however, and wisely, in my opinion, because it would
undermine the point about the determinacy of natural language, which,
as we have seen, is the first premise of his position. His considered view is
that the "implied exceptions" for cases like this go to the imperative
force of the directive, in the hierarchy of Beth over Sam, rather than to
the meaning or content of the directive itself (pp. 16-17).
Even so, this approach to rules involves some theoretical difficulty.
Greenawalt notes Frederick Schauer's suggestion that the "ruleness" of a
rule is undermined if the addressee is required to consider and act on the
balance of reasons as they occur to him; in these circumstances the direc-
tive itself would be little more than a "rule of thumb" reminding him of
the (defeasible) advantages of door-shutting for the organization."0 More
generally, Joseph Raz has argued that the authority of rules is to be
understood on the basis that they provide "exclusionary reasons," that is,
reasons for the addressee not to act on the balance of reasons as they
appear to him."1 Inasmuch as he works out for himself whether company
10. See Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE LAW JOURNAL 509, 534-38 (1988).
11. See JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 58-84 (1975). Greenawalt, however,
does not cite or discuss Raz's work.
1993] 559
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welfare is best served by shutting the door in the face of the president, it
seems that Sam is no longer treating Beth's directive as an exclusionary
reason for action.
Greenawalt's response to this is that the rule remains authoritative qua
rule for all ordinary cases. Though exceptions can always be imagined,
"[m]any, many standard circumstances will remain," he says, in which
Sam's duty in regard to the directive is clear (pp. 18-19). But this mis-
leadingly suggests that the issue is a purely quantitative matter: "The
reader's experience will attest that in an extremely high percentage of
situations in which someone is directed or requested to shut the door, no
genuinely exceptional circumstance intervenes" (p. 18; my emphasis).
Percentages like this are precisely what rules of thumb are based on;
whereas rule-following in the authoritative sense is qualitatively different
from that.
Occasionally Greenawalt gestures towards the real solution to this dif-
ficulty-that Beth's directive is understood by Sam to be exclusionary of
certain reasons and not others. He is not to consider the effect of closing
the door on his own well-being, nor even its marginal effect on Beth's
well-being; but it may be understood that there is a range of other consid-
erations which, if they are present, are not excluded by the force of the
directive. The idea that a norm may be exclusionary of some reasons and
not others-and that that distinction may be quickly recognizable as one
of kind and not involve fresh calculations by the addressee on every occa-
sion-has emerged in recent discussions of Raz's work. 2 Now it is by no
means clear whether it can be sustained. Nevertheless I think it a pity
that Greenawalt did not alert his more theoretically-minded colleagues
to the existence of this discussion.
In the examples we have been considering, the role of shared assump-
tions and underlying purposes is relatively clear, as are the relevant
assumptions and purposes themselves. It is not hard for Sam to figure out
the point of Beth's directive and the organizational reasons for his subor-
dination to her; and the range of purposes that Olive, even at her most
contrary, can attribute to a dog-leashing ordinance is fairly limited.
There are two directions one could go from there. One could take these
examples as models of the determinacy of actually existing legal systems:
that is, one could say, in Greenawalt's rhetoric, that "an extremely high
percentage" or "many, many" applications of legal rules are as determi-
nate as this, and use that conclusion to discredit legal skepticism. Alter-
natively, one could use these examples to model the indeterminacy of
actually existing legal rules, highlighting the happy ease with which Sam
12. See particularly the articles by Michael S. Moore, Yasutomo Morigiwa, Stephen Perry, and
Joseph Raz in Symposium: The Works of Joseph Raz, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 827, 897, 913, 1153 (1989).
[Vol. 5: 553
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and Olive can reach confident conclusions about underlying purposes to
throw into relief our inability in many hard cases to do just that.
The second approach is more subtle and surely the more illuminating,
and it pays better tribute to whatever strengths the skeptical position has.
After all, people do disagree and disagree radically about the purposes to
be attributed to legal and constitutional provisions, about the methods
for determining and imputing such purposes, and about the underlying
purpose of legal authority and subordination in general. The way that
Greenawalt establishes the determinacy of Sam's case and Olive's case
implies clearly, though in a backhanded way, that such disagreement and
uncertainty about purpose are bound to undermine the determinate and
objective application of the law. If Sam were as torn about the underlying
purpose of "Please shut the door" as, for example, contemporary consti-
tutional scholars are about whether the First Amendment serves expres-
sivist or civic republican purposes, he would stand paralyzed on the
threshold to Beth's office not knowing what to do, whether the president
were approaching or not.
Now, as a matter of fact, constitutional adjudication is not para-
lyzed---exactly at the point at which Greenawalt's analysis of "objective"
decision-making suggests that it ought to be. So the conclusion is obvi-
ous: adjudication proceeds in the cases where the indeterminacy thesis
really bites on a basis that has little or nothing to do with objectivity as
Greenawalt conceives it. Needless to say, this line of argument is not
considered in Law and Objectivity; indeed there is very little attempt by
the author to stand back from his examples and reflect in a subtle and
reasonably open-minded manner on what they may show about the plau-
sibility of his opponents' positions
I said at the beginning of this section that whether Greenawalt's analy-
sis of Sam and Beth works may depend on some of the footnotes I omit-
ted from the quoted passage. Recall that Beth has said to Sam, "Please
shut the door," and that Greenawalt expects Sam to proceed immedi-
ately to close the office door unless there is something in his past rela-
tions with his boss that suggests "other than a straightforward
significance to Beth's words" (p. 14). At this point, Greenawalt adds in a
footnote: " 'Shutting the door' might mean cutting losses on a project
Sam is supervising" (p. 238 n. 6). In other words, language may be used
in a way that is special to this type of interaction, a way that is belied by
the ordinary conventions of English usage.
That possibility is remote enough to be dismissed and relegated to a
footnote for the purposes of the example, but it is by no means clear that
this dismissal should hold as we extrapolate from Sam's case to the more
difficult issues of modem jurisprudence.
As I understand it, the argument that law is indeterminate is often
based, first, on the existence of a specialized legal vocabulary and legal
1993]
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hermeneutics, and, secondly, on the realization that the conventions that
constitute this special discourse are highly equivocal and contested. Both
points are relevant to the issues Greenawalt is discussing. The first under-
mines the transparency of legal standards in terms of natural language
and calls into question an important legitimating connection between
legal determinacy and some of the ideals associated with the rule of
law. 3 The second contradicts the claim that legal rules can serve as an
objective basis for settling social and political disagreements even among
those who have been acculturated in its ways. If a conservative group of
lawyers and scholars have one specialist understanding of a legal provi-
sion and a liberal group another, then the idea that the determinacy of
the standard is what settles disputes between them is simply hopeless.
Certainly there is more to be said on the matter than this, but Greena-
walt's relegation of the issue of specialist understandings to a two-line
footnote does not advance the discussion at all. There is a brief insistence
late in the book on the transparency of legal reasoning. According to
Greenawalt, all legal reasons have counterparts in the ordinary reasoning
processes of common sense (pp. 199-201):
[W]hen I think of major decisions in fields I know something about,
constitutional law, criminal law, torts, and contracts, I cannot recall
one whose underlying basic arguments would be incomprehensible
to a person of ordinary intelligence and a high school education (p.
199).
But even if that is true, the situation may be that there are multiple and
competing connections between ordinary modes of reasoning and those
accepted in the law; and then something must be said to address the
specter of contestability that competing modes of reasoning give rise to.
Also, there is some discussion in Chapter Three of what counts as a
shared understanding of some legal provision among practitioners.
Greenawalt insists that unanimity is not required: "If ... there is only
slight dissent from the prevailing understanding-one person out of a
hundred takes a view different from the other ninety-nine-we can still
speak of a shared understanding" (p. 53). But that is almost all he says
on the matter. His discussion, again, is misleadingly quantitative and
entirely defensive-insisting that the standards for consensus should not
be as high, and that there is not as much disagreement, in fact, as the
CLS scholars claim. He makes no attempt to state the opposing case in
its strongest terms, in a way that would add interest as well as self-satis-
faction to its rebuttal.
I do not think, then, that this part of Greenawalt's book will convince
any one who has been troubled by the indeterminacy critique and who
13. See, e.g., the discussion of promulgation and clarity in LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF
LAW 49-51 and 63-65 (1964).
[Vol. 5: 553
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has an open mind on the philosophical issues that underlie it. One or two
of the points that Greenawalt makes may convince such a person that the
critical case is overstated. He does a good job of showing that "[t]he
norms of any legal system are determinate in their nonapplicability to
countless human activities" (p. 37):
Pushing someone during an argument is not a larceny, or a taxable
transaction, or acceptance under the law of contract, and it is not a
tort (civil wrong) against a stranger who witnesses the pushing on
the television news. If a citizen of Poland pushes another Polish
citizen in Warsaw, that is not a crime in Vermont (pp. 36-37).
Arguments like this are no doubt useful in establishing Greenawalt's the-
sis that, for practical purposes, it is "ridiculous" to suggest that no legal
questions have determinate answers. But I'm afraid his discussion seldom
rises above this level of argumentation, and even when he addresses the
issue of genuinely hard cases, he shies away from hard argument with a
bland but unconvincing assurance:
The percentage of determinate answers may decline as we move
from the multitude of instances when an individual thinks about
possible liability, to instances when such thoughts lead to discussion,
to instances when an expert (or a published guide) is consulted, but
even in the last category many answers to legal questions will be
indisputable (p. 37).
III
Consideration of the determinacy of legal rules takes up only the first
part of the book. The remainder is devoted to brief discussions of a vari-
ety of topics which have very little in common, except that each raises
questions that could be phrased using the term "objectivity." These top-
ics include: (1) the law's interest in controlling external behavior rather
than thoughts and attitudes; (2) the use of "reasonable person" standards
rather than subjective standards in determining liability; (3) the meaning
of "bias" and "discrimination"; (4) affirmative action; (5) the feminist
critique of generality in law; (6) law and economics; and (7) the relation
between legal standards and moral and religious standards.
With the exception of (7), which I shall consider in section IV, the
discussion of these issues is brisk and cursory. I think I can save the
reader time by relating the main conclusion on each topic. (1) "Few peo-
ple in American society would wish the law to alter radically in this
respect" (p. 97). (2) "Even if the difference between being aware of a risk
and not being aware of it is of moral importance, the attempt ... to
discern what a particular individual thought is... altogether too compli-
cated for the crude fact-finding methods of criminal trials" (p. 102). (3)
"To turn all disagreements about acceptable use of categories of race and
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gender into issues of whether people are 'biased' is to inflate rhetoric and
obscure various bases of disagreement" (p. 128). (4) "[T]he likely benefits
of [affirmative action] classifications often outweigh the likely harms and
. . . these likely benefits are sufficient to justify them" (p. 133). (5)
"[S]ome aspects of particular activities rightly call for a more principled
approach than others" (p. 158). (6) "Any argument that wealth max-
imization is the proper objective of a political system is demonstrably
fallacious, though I shall not attempt the demonstration here" (p. 174).
Those are Greenawalt's positions. I will not bore the reader with the
details of his defense of them. The arguments, such as they are, are
scarcely more interesting (or, for that matter, very much more substan-
tial) than the conclusions.
The unsatisfying nature of these discussions raises a question about the
overall strategy of the book. The book is supposed to comprise a discus-
sion of the various senses in which law might be thought to be, or not be,
objective. Now Greenawalt acknowledges at the outset that the word
"objectivity" may be unhelpful: "Perhaps 'objectivity' has become so
unclarifying and controversial a label, we would do better to find another
vocabulary" (p. 3). "Objective," after all, can mean external (as opposed
to internal), provable (as opposed to conjectural), constrained (as
opposed to discretionary), reasoned (as opposed to arbitrary), grounded
(as opposed to autonomous), fair (as opposed to biased), general (as
opposed to particular), and so on. 4
Indeed, in several of these senses, it is not clear that objective is neces-
sarily a good thing for the law to be. Defenders of legal reasoning have
often stressed its autonomy and independence, rather than its being
objectively grounded in some other reputable discipline such as moral
philosophy or social science.' 5 In criminal law, there is often a call for
standards that are tailored more to the subjective beliefs and apprehen-
sions of particular persons than to the objective standards of "the reason-
able man."' 6 Feminist jurisprudence, too, has attacked the "abstract
universality" implicit in liberal conceptions of the rule of law, stressing
the need for particularized and relational concern rather than impersonal
and objective standards.' 7 The discussion of these topics in the book does
not fit easily with the overall sense that the objectivity of law and legal
reasoning is something to be vindicated against a radical or skeptical
critique.
I think that Greenawalt's initial impulse was to address the issue I
identified in sections I and II: the determinacy of legal standards, the
intellectual respectability of legal reasoning, and the defense of all that
14. I have adapted this from a list Greenawalt provides, supra note 1, at 93.
15. For Greenawalt's discussion of this issue, see id. at 197-202.
16. Greenawalt devotes a chapter to this: id. at 93-120.
17. See the discussion in id. at 154-159.
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against the CLS onslaught. Noticing that this was often presented as a
concern about the objectivity of law, Greenawalt responded initially with
the classic analytical riposte that "objective" has a number of different
senses, not all of which are addressed by CLS scholars. His own patient
analysis of those different senses, however, revealed an array of other
intriguing topics, on some of which-as it happened-Greenawalt also
had a view. Calling his project "Law and Objectivity" enabled him to
combine a discussion of those topics with the pursuit of his main theme.
The result, then, is not really a sustained argument in defense of legal
determinacy at all, but a volume consisting of a series of general remarks
on a variety of issues of interest to the author, combined under what he
himself concedes is a very "broad rubric" (p. vii).
I doubt that anyone engaged in the detailed discussion of any of these
topics will come away from the book with the thought that it has
advanced that discussion very much. A reader may come away with an
assurance that there is a sensible middle-ground on many of these issues
and that Kent Greenawalt occupies it. But whatever comfort accrues
from knowing that is likely to be offset by the rather bad name that
assurances without arguments give to traditional jurisprudence in the
eyes of the more radical critics of the law.
IV
The last part of Law and Objectivity deals mainly with the various
relations that can exist between law and morality-"morality" both in
the sense of existing community standards, and in the sense of the tran-
scendent standards to which we aspire in our critical moral thinking.
The idea is that a connection here might assure us that
the law is rooted in something broader, that it is not spun out of the
web of an autonomous law, is not floating free as the mere fiat of
those who happen to make it, and is not simply a series of ad hoc
compromises emerging from clashes of personal preferences (p.
168).
In his discussion of this possibility, Greenawalt shows a refreshing
willingness to take the skeptical position seriously, in detail, and on its
merits. He notes, first, that "[flacile talk about dominant cultural moral-
ity" often assumes simplistically that there is a single moral consensus in
society (p. 166). But on many vexed questions that the law has to face-
he cites the obvious example of abortion-there is sharp moral division.
Indeed, to the extent that there is a shared consensus on certain mat-
ters-the wrongness of racism, for example-that may be partly a prod-
uct of the law and thus not something that in itself can be cited as an
independent anchoring for legal standards (p. 168).
In any case, such grounding would beg the question of whether the
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dominant consensus on morality is itself respectable from a critical point
of view. Parts of the dominant morality may benefit some in society at
the expense of others-enshrining dominant patterns of class or gender,
for example. "Obviously," says Greenawalt, "if law fits with these unde-
sirable aspects of cultural morality, that fit does not show conformity
with any objective standard of goodness or rightness" (p. 169). On the
other hand, there is wisdom, he says, in avoiding the tension and resent-
ment that arises inevitably from a dislocation between legal norms and
local moral standards (p. 169). And he summarily dismisses Roberto
Unger's argument that even respectable local standards should not be set
in stone, observing that "being dragged in different directions does not
usually enhance people's freedom in a significant sense" (p. 169).
More interestingly, Greenawalt criticizes a position advanced recently
by my colleague, Mel Eisenberg, to the effect that common law reasoning
involves the use of moral standards simply on the basis that they are
socially accepted rather than on the basis of any critical or philosophical
assessment. 8 Greenawalt insists that in a pluralistic society, where there
is a diversity of views, and where accepted standards wax and wane, it is
impossible for courts to follow Eisenberg's prescription without making
critical moral judgments in their own voice. For they must determine,
when a community standard is contested, how much support is enough
support, and they must decide also what weight to give a standard domi-
nant in the community against other standards (say, standards laid down
in the constitution) when they conflict. These questions cannot be
addressed without an appeal to standards of appropriate political moral-
ity (pp. 217-18).
What is to be said, then, about the grounding of legal standards in
critical morality? Greenawalt accepts that legal standards often explicitly
require judges to answer moral questions in their own voice,' 9 and he
accepts also the position (associated with Ronald Dworkin's jurispru-
dence 20 ) that, even when moral questions are not posed explicitly in the
law, legal interpretation requires in part that a court make judgments
about moral rights and justice (p. 215). Greenawalt's initial position is
that, if we focus on legal questions whose answer depends on sound judg-
ments of morality, we may conclude that the legal questions have objec-
18. MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 15 (1988): "The question
then arises, what criteria should a moral norm satisfy if it is to figure in common law reasoning? The
answer is that when moral norms are relevant to establishing, applying, or changing common law
rules, the courts should employ social morality, by which I mean moral standards that claim to be
rooted in aspirations for the community as a whole, and that, on the basis of an appropriate
methodology, can fairly be said to have substantial support in the community, can be derived from
norms that have such support, or appear as if they would have such support."
19. See his discussion (pp. 188-90) of the "good moral character" standard in immigration law,
as discussed in Repouille v. United States, 165 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1947).
20. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW's EMPIRE 249 (1986).
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tively correct answers only if the moral questions have correct answers
(p. 221).
However, the view he ultimately adopts is a little more complicated
than that. If moral skeptics are correct, and there are no right answers to
questions of critical morality, then that skepticism provides a ground for
legal skepticism. On the other hand, refuting moral skepticism, though
necessary, is not sufficient to refute legal skepticism (in regard to the
moral underpinning of legal standards). Everything depends on the basis
of the right answers in morality and on the sources and character of
moral reasons. Greenawalt asks us to concentrate on the possibility-a
possibility he personally embraces (p. 221)-that moral objectivity is
based on the will and understanding of God, and that it is reasonable for
us to follow God's will to the extent we can ascertain it. It does not
follow, he says, from this theologically grounded moral objectivity that
legal questions which turn on moral issues also have correct answers.
The moral question has a correct answer only in light of sources of
understanding that are connected to . . . theological truth. These
sources are not subject to interpersonal reason and validation by
persons who do not accept the theological premises. The central
issue is whether reasons based on these sources count for a "balance
of reasons" that constitutes a correct answer in law (p. 222).
The trouble, he indicates, is that our political and constitutional heritage
precludes appeal to reasons of certain kinds in public life. "Given princi-
ples of religious liberty and separation of church and state .... a reason
that rests on a theological truth that is not generally accepted should not
count as a reason for what the existing law provides" (p. 222). The criti-
cal moral reasoning that we use in legal settings must be limited to argu-
ments that do not rest on unshared religious claims. Unfortunately, by
that limited set of considerations, many of the moral issues implicated in
law are "radically inconclusive" (p. 226). It follows-and Greenawalt
acknowledges this-that the legal questions that implicate them do not
have right answers, though he adds that it is no doubt part of the mental-
ity of judges to go on addressing them as if they did.
I hope I have indicated that this part of Law and Objectivity is much
more interesting than the rest. In this discussion, Greenawalt is revisiting
themes that he took up in his earlier work,2 and he is sufficiently
engaged with them not to bypass the tough issues with the brusque but
unconvincing reassurances of common sense that pass for argument in
the rest of the book.
There are, of course, a number of questions that can be raised about
his position on religious arguments. Do religious liberty and church-state
separation really entail the wrongness of appeals to theologically
21. See KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTION AND POLITICAL CHOICE (1988).
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grounded truth in legal argumentation? Couldn't we allow such argu-
mentation, but still insist that it must never be used to justify religious
establishment or restrictions on individual freedom of worship? If reli-
gious reasons are not adduced in favor of religious restrictions, why
exactly is it wrong to appeal to them? Greenawalt suggests that it is
because they involve modes of reasoning that are not shared in the com-
munity. But that could be said, in the last resort, of any mode of reason-
ing, including scientific, sociological, and historical reasoning. There is a
growing literature on these matters in modem political philosophy,22 and
Professor Greenawalt is of course well aware of it. One could have
wished that he had gone on to address that literature directly in this
discussion: much more, as he concedes, could be said (p. 222). But by the
end of Law and Objectivity, one is sufficiently relieved to have found at
last some argument, some detail, and some engagement, that its author
may be excused for having run out of space at the crucial moment.
22. See, e.g., Thomas Nagel, Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy, 16 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 215
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